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One aspect of water reform in Zimbabwe is increased stakeholder participation
in water management through catchment boards. This paper uses discourse
analysis to explore relationships among different stakeholders in consultative
meetings facilitated to achieve wider participation among all stakeholders.
Consultation over the water allocation system provides a case for the
analysis of interfaces where multiple stakeholders meet and interact.
Though inclusive of a wide range of stakeholders, catchment boards are
far from being democratic organisations. Water democracy without water
development is difficult to achieve, while water democracy that ignores
the present dualism in access to resources perpetuates differentials
in participation by all stakeholders. INTRODUCTION In the proposed Zimbabwe Water Act to replace the Water Act of 1976,
increased stakeholder participation in management through catchment
boards is an important facet of the new law. Idealized notions of participation
have caused a crisis of expectations between stakeholders at all levels.[2]
Case material shows that the reluctance of state to relinquish control
is widespread. For example, the delays in passing draft legislation
in Thailand, the reluctance to use existing authority to empower indigenous
forest protection committees in India, the ineffectiveness of most measures
that favour indigenous groups in South America, and the devolution of
authority to local government officials rather than to user communities
in Zimbabwe.[3] Increasingly, the advocates of inclusive
decision making have began to raise questions about its limits. The
level of participation moves from non-participation through degrees
to tokenism to full involvement.[4] However, populist
development literature suggests that there are cases where participation
in decision-making has meant more actors are moving from being users
choosers of services to become actors agents in broader processes of
governance.[5] However, this reversal of roles is
only possible if all stakeholders are able to negotiate and bargain
fairly within the catchment boards. Increased stakeholder involvement means creating partnerships through
which goals can be pursued. However, convergent interests of various
stakeholders do not always mean identical interests.[6]
To form effective partnerships, one must know one’s partners well.[7]
According to Uphoff et. al. (1997) the wisest course is to bring divergent
views and interests into the open, where they can be dealt with under
the rubric of a united organization. Differences are then framed by
overarching goals on which there is agreement. In most countries there
is an imbalance of power among various stakeholders, with the state
often retaining most of the power.[8] According to
Bourdieu (1990), bringing together different interests is not sufficient
in itself to promote cooperation. Meaningful participation in the negotiation
process is impossible without some power to influence the results. Marquet
(1971) defines power as an ability by one actor to impose one’s
views or opinions on others. To mount a credible bid to exercise power,
individuals must combine with others; thus power is accumulated and
exercised in the context of political organization.[9]
Further, Bratton (1994) notes that power is a scarce resource, which
tends to crystallize within a limited number of organizations. Power
is also something that is possessed, accumulated and imposed upon others.[10]
Vallereal (1992) also notes that power always implies struggle, negotiation
and compromise. Without power there is no bargaining position and negotiation
becomes a one-sided affair.[11] Stakeholder participation in water management involves a reweaving
of power among multiple stakeholders who share decision-making power.
In this new scheme, old elites must give up some of their power and
recognize the voice of previously marginalized stakeholders. However,
much research demonstrates that this reweaving of power has not occurred.[12]
Often the following assumptions are made about multi-stakeholder relationships: Despite the stated intensions of social inclusion, it has become clear
that many multiple-stakeholder initiatives do not deal well with the
complexity of actor differences.[13] Stakeholders
are neither homogenous in composition and concerns, nor are they necessarily
harmonious in their relations. This article examines relationships among
stakeholders involved in a consultative process to decide on the appropriate
mechanism for sharing water in one of the two pilot catchment areas
in Zimbabwe; the Mazoe Pilot Catchment. WATER REFORM AND STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN CATCHMENT BOARDS Following the avid interest by local and international researchers
in collaborative management initiatives like Communal Areas Management
Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), water reform in Zimbabwe
has received much attention. Research has focused on many aspects of
water reform; from institutional and legal aspects to politics and advocacy
for reform.[14] There are many more unpublished
papers presented at several workshops that have been held to review
the water reform process.[15] According to Dougherty
(1997), the Mazoe Pilot Catchment is representative of the seven catchments
in Zimbabwe. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that some of the
issues highlighted in this catchment will also be faced in other catchments.
Dougherty describes the Mazoe Pilot Catchment thus: The proposed structure for stakeholder representation in the pilot
catchment is shown in Figure 1. At the local level, water user boards
have been defined as areas with boundaries similar to the existing river
boards. However, in some cases the boundaries have been defined on other
criteria and therefore do not necessarily fit with the areas under the
jurisdiction of the River Boards. The RB chairperson and deputy sit
on the sub-catchment board. There are also two representatives from
each sub-catchment board seated on the pilot Catchment Board. Dougherty
notes that different stakeholders are “well able to work together”
though relationships with a decentralised state structures such as the
proposed Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) will provide backstopping
support to the proposed catchment boards.[16] Figure 1. The Proposed Institutional Structure for the Mazoe Catchment
Board Source: Doughtery 1997 In order to understand how the water reform process is unfolding in
Zimbabwe, we must examine the relationships between the state and civil
society.[17] Until now, the state has been viewed
as all powerful, and in control of formulating and implementing policy.
However, as is the recent case in many African countries, the state
is becoming weaker and withdrawing from local level management. Further
more there are increased pressures for the state to engage other stakeholders
in decision-making processes. In Zimbabwe, attempts at democratising
management exist in the wildlife and forestry sector with varying degrees
of success. Derman and Ferguson (1999) examine how water reform has
been shaped by wider political and economic crises facing the country
with the result that water has become the focus of wide-ranging contestations
for equitable distribution of resources. The Water Act of 1976 granted
water rights through the Priority Date System. Under this system, rights
could be held in perpetuity. New applicants for water in catchments
where there were many rights holders would therefore have little chance
of getting rights. In many catchments rights are largely held by commercial
farmers whose families have held these for many years. Few, if any,
communal farmers held rights to water. The act provided for the formation
of River Boards, but membership to these was limited to water right
holders. Since water rights were held largely by commercial farmers
and other commercial concerns (e.g. industry, mines, corporations, urban
areas) the 1976 Act excluded new and emergent commercial users and communal
area users. Therefore, the specific objectives for water reform in Zimbabwe,
the promotion of stakeholder participation in the decision-making processes
and the decentralization of water management institutions to the catchment
and sub-catchment levels. Though examples of democratising management exist in Zimbabwe and
elsewhere in the developing world, different resources seem to require
different types of organisational arrangements for working with multiple-stakeholders.
In Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE worked through producer communities coordinated
by district councils. Forest resources management occurred through committees
under the control of the Forestry Commission that manage non- timber
products from state forests. For water, these institutions have taken
the form of catchment boards. The Royal Dutch Embassy funded consultancy
recommended the creation of a pilot catchment authority to serve as
a model for decentralised water management.[18]
In 1990, the Mazoe River Board petitioned the government though the
Mazoe River Community Development Group (MRCDG) to be the second pilot
catchment authority.[19] The MRCDG group includes
many stakeholders and has shown a great willingness to work with communal
farmers. However, Derman and Ferguson (1999) describe the group as class
based and dominated by members with commercial interests. The Water
Resource Management Strategy Group (WRMSG) was asked to assist both
pilot catchments and is now assisting all stakeholders that seek to
form catchment board. Until the act is passed, the pilot catchment can
only be involved in planning. As part of this planning process, the
catchment board must decide on a fair and equitable means of distributing
water from the catchment. That stakeholders in the Mazoe catchment petitioned
the state to create their board suggests a high level of stakeholder
involvement and interest. Consequently, the Mazoe catchment board provides
in interesting case study for assessing the role of stakeholder involvement
in the reform process. In response to frequent calls for logistical support the board received
a small grant from German Technical Service (GTZ) to conduct 5 sub-catchment
level meetings to discuss the Fractional Water Allocation System which
the Mazoe Pilot Catchment Board wishes to adopt.[20]
In the proposed system, allocation of water is approved on the basis
of the application and only granted in relation to total available water
in the catchment. These sub-catchment meetings focus on the allocation
system and provide a barometer to gauge the level of participation by
stakeholders both in the pilot catchment and in the broader water reform
process. However, events that are described in this paper are highly
context dependent and are used only as cases in which key concerns about
participation in multiple stakeholder organisational arrangements can
be addressed. Bolding et al. (1997) identify decentralisation of water allocation
through the involvement of local water organisations as one of the crucial
elements of successful water reform. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) define
decentralisation as any act in which central government formally cedes
powers to stakeholders and lower level institutions. Devolving power
to lower level stakeholders involves creating a realm of decision-making
where a variety of lower-level stakeholders can exercise some autonomy.
Agrawal and Ribot suggest that there are three distinct facets of decentralisation:
stakeholders, power, and accountability. Agrawal and Ribot argue that
state without an understanding of the power of various actors, the domain
in which they exercise their power, and to whom they are accountable,
it is impossible to learn the extent of decentralisation. According
to Ribot, the frustration with top-down management has led to the privileging
of civil society in decisions formerly reserved for the state. Yet it
is becoming evident that participation by other actors is more than
just a privilege, it is a fundamental right that determines the sustainability
of different management options. Ribot also argues that political decentralisation
requires a switch from decentralised administrative despotism to autonomous
forms of locally accountable representative governments. However, Agrawal
and Ribot find that though advocates of decentralisation often justify
it on grounds of the increased participation, efficiency, or equity,
most efforts fail to increase the powers of some stakeholders, particularly
local communities. This paper examines the relationships among stakeholders
and the shifts in power, particularly between the state and commercial
farmers, commercial farmers and local communities, and local community
relations with the state. METHODOLOGY Since 1998, the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University
of Zimbabwe has collaborated on a BASIS/CRISP[21]
funded programme to monitor the water reform process in Zimbabwe. The
study focuses on the Mazoe pilot catchment that extends over an area
of 21 000 square kilometres and spans three provinces (Manicaland, Mashonaland
East and Mashonaland Central). This is one of a number of papers focusing
on different aspects of the reform process. Program researchers attend
all the meetings held by organisations at different levels of the catchment.
Some of the insights from these meetings inform the discussion and conclusion
of this article.[22] The dominant source of data for this article was these consultative
meetings. Stakeholder groups are considered an interface where relationships
are negotiated. Umans (1995) defines an interface as a critical point
of intersection or linkage between different social systems or fields
of social order where structural discontinuities based upon difference
of normative values and social interests are most likely found. Analysts
of social interfaces attempt to reveal the dynamic and emergent nature
of these interactions and show how the objectives, perceptions, priorities
and relationships of various actors are influenced as a result of the
encounter.[23] Typically these interacting parties
are differentiated in terms of relations of power.[24]
This paper treats the consultative meetings as interfaces where we can
begin to make sense of the relationships among stakeholders in the Mazoe
pilot catchment. Further, Mukamuri (1995) suggests that in these meetings,
one can view dialogue as socially constructed text that results from
regular negotiations and contests. Fortmann (1995) suggests that meetings
of this nature are forums for discursive strategies where stories are
an important “oral manifestation of local discourse seeking to
define and claim resources.”[25] However, the
public nature of group meetings may promote dissident views held by
a small group while silencing the majority views.[26]
In existing Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) literature, practitioners
suggest various methods to increase group participation. However, if
we understand participation at these consultative meetings as the discursive
strategies that Fortmann describes, there is a danger of forestalling
processes of negotiations and bargaining by simply labelling them as
conflicts. Some negotiations are low visibility processes and difficult
to identify. There is no attempt in this paper to expose these processes.
Rather, observations are largely confined to group dynamics, individual
posturing and outcomes from the consultative meetings. The duration of these meetings varied between one and half hours to
three hours. Proceedings were not fully documented and there was no
evidence that discussions were recorded. All meetings were very well
attended, suggesting a stakeholder participation of between 90-100%
at some locations. Data was collected from 3 of the 5 planned consultative
meetings. Issues raised in these three meetings are relevant to the
whole consultative process within the pilot catchment and will likely
have wider relevance in the general reform process with Zimbabwe’s
water sector. CASE STUDIES Case Study 1: Nyagui Sub- Catchment Board Meeting (October
6, 1999) Participants at this meeting were a mixed group of white commercial
farmers, representatives of water boards and catchment boards, district
council and government officials, and representatives of area chiefs.
Participation appeared largely skewed towards commercial farmers and
a few government and district council representatives. However, many
commercial farmers left the meetings at teatime. Villagers attended
the meeting but their participation was largely limited to seeking clarification
and trying to understand their role in the meeting. All villagers left
at the end of the meeting. In the Nyagui meeting, many villagers interrupted
the meeting near its end because they wanted to adjourn and catch buses
to their home areas. The main issues for commercial farmers concerned security of tenure
for stored water and how the proposed water allocation system would
impact their investment in agriculture. The official response to this
concern was that access to bigger dams would guarantee requested allocations
as well as any surpluses that may exist in the catchment. In the words
of one district council representative, the issue of security and storage
remained fundamental in the discussion of equity in the new system.
As far as he was concerned, “the new and proposed system changes
nothing. Those with dams or money to build dams still have a comparative
advantage over those in communal areas who have no hope in hell of ever
building and sustaining one.” Another participant echoed this concern
and stated that “we may say we are changing the system, yet we
are bringing it back in another way. This is cosmetic change. Now we
say those with dams must be given surplus water. What has changed then?
Where is the change?” Some villagers wanted to know who would pay
for water storage in communal areas or if they would have rights to
use storage in dams on adjacent commercial farms. The answer was that
“no one would build dams except yourselves. Don’t wait for
the government. They have failed to do this over many generations and
will not start now.” This pronunciation seemed to take the wind
out of the whole discussion and raised the concern that perhaps the
participation of villagers in water allocation and management was irrelevant. The few villagers who actively participated were concerned to differentiate
between different sources of water. While most understood the reasoning
behind allocating and managing water in dams, few understood the reasoning
for doing this with small weirs, boreholes, pools or springs. In the
words of the moderator of the meeting, “water is water. No distinction
is made about which source. It is use that will determine whether that
water should be paid for or not.” Another issue highlighted by
villagers was the issue of “fundamental rights to subsistence water,”
especially in periods of shortage when they face unnecessary hardships
while neighbours have water in their dams. Thus “water should be
available to all, rich or poor, but the person who compounds the water
is the one who makes the river dry.” At this point, conflicts between
commercial farmers and villagers were highlighted as downstream people
faced hardships while commercial farmers “sat on their water. The
advantage belongs to the person who owns a dam.” Many participants wanted to know whether any provisions had been made
in the new act to allow access by villagers to some of this water for
subsistence purposes. This issue points to the fundamental differences
between various stakeholders and their understanding of rights to water.
In the rural context, water that is usually more rigorously controlled,
or even privatised becomes less, stringently controlled during drought
periods. As with traditional water rights there some accommodation to
any human being’s basic right to water for domestic and livestock
use.[27] This is a different case with many commercial
farmers whose view of resources is essentially that private rights remain
private regardless of circumstances. Most of the villagers active in this meeting were representatives
of water boards or sub catchment boards. Yet they stated that “we
have come to the meeting but we don’t know what it is about.”
This unwillingness to identify with the process, what researchers later
called orchestrated ignorance, was actually a strategy used by the villagers
to reject the proposal. In many instances, participants stated that
they could not endorse a proposal that they did not understand. Few
villagers showed much interest in the discussions at these meetings.
Some participants blamed their lack of participation on the use of English
in the meeting. In some cases, there were clearly discrepancies in the
translations, which the participants found annoying. One district councillor
pointed out that it seemed the catchment board themselves were not yet
clear about the proposal. Therefore the councillor recommended that
“they should go back and straighten out the differences before
seeking to close the gaps that exist between the catchment board and
other lower structures.” Case Study 2: Nyadiri Sub-Catchment Consultative Meeting (October
13, 1999) The Nyadiri consultative meeting was well attended and dominated by
the presence of traditional leaders. There were three chiefs and fifteen
headman, two councillors and thirteen members of the various water boards
that constitute the Nyadiri sub-catchment. There were no women represented
in this group. Though it is widely acknowledged that local traditional
authorities should be involved with water boards and sub-catchment boards,
they have not been consistently involved in the process. Most chiefs
expressed the sentiment that they did not understand why they were invited.
The chiefs stated that “most people did not know about permits.
The meeting was the first time they were being told about such issues
or indeed being asked to get involved. As far as water is concerned
most people follow the ways of their forefathers and are not aware that
this or that use is illegal.” Even when it became evident that
more stakeholders would be involved in the new reform process, the participants
perceived the meeting as a knowledge-sharing mission with the state,
not as a process of consultation. One chief stated that “what I
see as a problem is that there were no rules, but now the government
wants us to know these rules, so that we understand what will be difficult
in the future. They are now talking about permits, but our concern is
for our tiny gardens. You must explain to us for what kind of use these
rules apply.” The purpose of the meeting and the “so called” involvement
of local communities in the water reform process came as a surprise
to some of these chiefs. One chief stated that “when you are ignorant
you appear to be difficult because you slow down discussion. I believe
that he who wants a store applies to the district council for space
to build, you don’t apply if you don’t have money.” He
thereby suggested that those who have a stake or a greater interest
in water should be involved in the consultations rather than entire
communities. However, a representative from the catchment board countered
this suggestion, by stating that “in a church if a priest focuses
on infidelity, it does not imply that the whole congregation is involved.
Therefore, the consultations should involve, everyone even those that
appear not to have any interest in using water commercially now but
may do so in the future. We want to plan a framework for sharing for
the future.” In support of this position, another chief stated
“the main drawback that I see in this discussion is that many of
us are finding it impossible to plan for what we don’t have. We
don’t want to yoke the bull before the rains come. There is conflict
here. Lets continue with the discussion to see where it leads us. For
a person to buy shoes they must know their size.” Many of the chiefs
in the meeting would not believe that water could be shared or that
they could be part of the decision-making system. Thus for example,
one chief noted that “we can’t share what is flowing. How
do we plan or manage what is not there?” Thus, many participants insisted that the meeting focus on provision
of water bodies to marginalised areas before expecting people to participate
as equals in decisions about how water should be allocated. Discussing
the proposed water allocation system was therefore seen as “wasting
time discussing what should happen tomorrow when we have nothing and
are unlikely to see these plans. This is like buying maternity dresses
for women who were not even pregnant. You should build dams in communal
areas first before we come to this sort of discussion.” To most
participants in this group, the discussions were therefore abstract
and largely meaningless. One of the important chiefs in the area questioned
the meaning of consultation if the purpose was to “sell an alien
allocation system” which no one understood and or felt able to
judge. The respondent stated that “you just want to confuse us
when you know what you want. You know how water should be allocated,
yet you come to ask us when we are not even involved in allocation.
Is it possible to give a name to a child who is not even there?” The discussions also highlighted the polarity in views on how the
proposed allocation system would influence existing societal relations
and provide disincentives for expansion of agriculture in rural areas.
One participant observed that the proposed water allocation system would
make people with small-scale gardens or irrigation schemes abandon them
rather than pay fees for water. The willingness to pay for water is
an issue that will need to be addressed, especially where water had
long been regarded as a free resource. One responded stated that “This
water that you want permits for, who is making it? Who is its owner?
Can you really fight over water in the Nyadire sub-catchment? Why would
I want a permit for water that is flowing through?” Such stakeholders
clearly felt such an allocation system would surely mean an increase
in conflicts over scarce resources. Some of the members of sub-catchment boards seemed to not understand
the proportional allocation system, even though they are part of the
organisation that is proposing the system of sharing water (also see
Figure 1). The ignorance of sub-catchment board members suggests that
the centre was operating in isolation from other structures within the
catchment. One of the participants stated that “if water user board
members and sub catchment board members are also asking questions about
water reform, we begin to loose confidence in the programme because
there should be no information gap between these board members and the
Mazoe catchment board secretariat.” Chiefs expressed concern about
the election process for the various boards and noted that most of them
were not even aware of the existence of these structures in their areas. Case Study 3: Kairezi Sub-Catchment Board Discussions (October
13, 1999) The composition of the audience in the Kairezi consultative meeting
was thirteen white commercial farmers and twenty-four representatives
of rural water boards. There were also some government departments represented
at the meeting. From the whispered exchanges between farmers, the facial
expressions and tone of responses, some among the white commercial farmers
appeared impatient. Though these farmers were representing different
water boards, there seemed to have been some prior discussion among
them about which issues were to be raised at the meeting. All commercial
farmers left the meeting after the tea break, save for the two leaders
of sub-catchment boards. Most of the villagers stayed until the end
of the meeting, not because they had pressing issues that needed to
be resolved, but because money for travel and lunch was only given out
at the end of the meeting. Villagers seemed lost in much of the discussion.
Most had never applied for, held, or felt the need for a water right.
Commercial farmers dominated the meeting initially, asking questions
about security of rights to private existing dams, control over water
in those dams, and the relationship with their downstream neighbours.
The group of white farmers could be divided into those that wished to
understand the mechanics of the proposed system and those that viewed
any changes as a threat to established norms and practices. Most of
the hostility in the meeting emanated from those commercial farmers
with existing rights which they would lose or have to share. There were
also a commercial farmers who had wanted to increase their right and
some new applicants who found the discussion riveting and non-threatening.
Commercial farmers viewed stakeholder involvement in management and
allocation of water as a government attempt to transfer state responsibility
for providing water to communities. Commercial farmers believed that
being part of the stakeholder group would obligate them to support or
underwrite projects in their catchments, especially in communal areas,
which they perceived as a responsibility that should be shouldered by
the state. They further recognized that the disparities in access to
other resources would make it difficult to reach consensus. It was stated
in informal discussions over tea that such existing inequalities would
undermine effective stakeholder participation. Commercial farmers also expressed concern over conditions within the
state bureaucracy, which made the previous system increasingly unworkable
and fraught with administrative problems. The procedures of both the
old and new system were discussed. The villagers played very little
role in this discussion, as most of them noted that they were not acquainted
with either system. In addition, doubts were expressed about whether
the new system could work given the massive manpower resources required.
The issue of payment to bailiffs and other required personnel was discussed.
There was agreement that elected members of different council structures
could not be expected to work for free. None of the participants wanted
to shoulder the transaction costs of devolution, however empowering
to themselves. Participants at this consultative meeting were also concerned that
under the proposed allocation system, any activity deemed commercial
would pay for water. However, this definition becomes problematic in
communal areas where commercial enterprise is often not the primary
aim but an outcome when surpluses are sold. Irrigated agriculture outside
official irrigation schemes tends to be intermittent and disaggregated,
though farmers can derive substantial incomes. Questions were also raised
about the mechanics, infrastructure, manpower requirements for measuring
water use in communal areas. The water boards suggested that monitoring
all small gardens and schemes in their area would be too much work for
the potential returns. Participants noted that the revenue is controlled
by government and not invested back in the waterboard where it is collected.
So there is no incentive for such a system to work. They asked the secretariat
what was enabling about a system where the government makes “us
charge each other for resources we have invested in but are not accountable
to us for the use of that revenue?” For the villagers, the proposed
system is a disincentive especially to these used to government appropriating
successes in any activity. Many participants also asked how the proposed
system would survive the scourge of political interference and patronage
associated with it. Giving the councils more control of the revenue
would become an incentive for all water to be managed efficiently as
the benefits derived would be visible. However, white commercial farmers
argued that they did not want to subsidise water use by communal area
farmers who were also benefiting commercially. Villagers were less co-ordinated in their participation and seemed
more concerned with issues of investment in water and access to existing
dams. There was acknowledgement that since the government did not have
money to fund new projects, the users would have finance these projects.
Villagers clearly viewed this as a ridiculous suggestion as they were
barely able to subsist on the incomes they made in communal areas. Often
issues raised were title deeds and the ownership of water under conditions
very different from those on commercial farms. If a communal area farmer
decided to construct a dam, it would be more difficult for that farmer
to keep other residents from accessing the water. Moreover, the greater
threat of siltation made it very expensive to build dams in communal
areas. Since catchment boards did not control revenue generated by the
permit system, many doubted that the council would be in a position
to finance more communal area projects. Previously, the public consultations that preceded the Pungwe water
pipeline project had heightened people’s awareness in this catchment
that water needed to flow to other downstream users.[28]
Therefore the issue people raised in relation to this project was “how
much of the water in our rivers can we call our water?” Though
there was some attempt in the meeting to address downstream users and
their rights to water, it was clear that it would remain one of the
critical issues that would be debated before the approval of any management
and allocation plan. Transboundary resource sharing becomes particularly
pertinent in communal areas where there are such close ties between
peoples living along borders with other nations. DISCUSSION In the introduction we questioned the feasibility of real devolution
in water management. Devolution to local actors can be a mechanism of
increasing stakeholder participation and power sharing in decision making.[29]
Murphree (1990) and Murombedzi (1992) both deal with the issue of devolution
in wildlife management, highlighting the shift in power over wildlife
management between levels of government rather than to villagers. In
this context, government increased the autonomy of its regional offices,
thereby shifting the structure of local accountability from the central
government to local government structures. Yet this strategy preserved
the hierarchical relationship between the central government and lower
level structures.[30] The involvement of stakeholders
in the administration and management of catchments suggests that the
state has indeed devolved power to the local level. However, participants
in the Kairezi meeting remained wary of these new organisational structures.
They suggested that the new organisational structures merely added more
layers to an already malfunctioning bureaucracy. The connection of the
catchment board to ZINWA and the Department of Water meant the council
was viewed as an extension of government resulting in bureaucratic decentralisation.[31]
Moreover, as ZINWA will receive its revenue from catchment boards, as
happened in the case of CAMPFIRE, ZINWA will probably be reluctant to
devolve full control to catchment boards in order to guarantee its continued
access to much needed revenue.[32] For devolution
to truly occur, participants must see the catchment board as a government
itself rather than as a department of or an extension of the state.[33]
Justifying stakeholder participation in the water reform process
The need for rural stakeholders to participate in NRM decision making
has been widely emphasised.[34] This need was stressed
at every meeting, creating a slogan to face the seemingly insurmountable
odds against any co-operative behaviour among stakeholders. Participants
statements often as these questioned the role of government and emphasised
the need for self-sufficiency. For example, one popular statement was
“The Queen could not do it, the Smith government could not do it,
and the Mugabe government can’t do it. We have to rely on ourselves
and find means to realise our objectives. We must be strong and we must
do it ourselves.” Other statements also reiterated this view, such
as “We are tired of waiting for the government. We will die waiting”
or “People are dying from a sickness called mahalaitis” when
referring to frequent requests by villagers for more investment in water
by government and other external actors.[35] Other
statements were more reminiscent of wartime slogans: “This is our
country, our water and we want to share it equitably.” Another
statement often repeated during the meetings was “masimba kuvanhu
– power to the people,” used in these meetings to suggest
power to all stakeholders. However, in a situation where, development
of water resources has historically favoured one group over another,
it is evident that much more effort is needed to define the constituent
participants of these organisations. The proposed reforms are not viewed as homegrown by many participants,
suggested by the statement “You have presented your thoughts. Whose
water is this? You must not come here to confuse us, then say we are
being difficult.” Participants who are part of the catchment board
bureaucracy tended to isolate themselves from the proposal, which should
have been developed from below, with their consistent input. Throughout
the discussions, it was obvious that the lower structures of the catchment
do not identify at all with the proposals tabled by the catchment board.
The proposed allocation is believed to continue favouring those with
infrastructure, particularly white commercial farmers and the state.
According to the arguments presented at different meetings, access to
a storage facility guarantees access to your allotted water rights as
well as any surplus available in the catchment. Villagers with no access
to such storage facilities felt their participation only legitimises
the proposed allocation system, though there are little benefits for
themselves. As one participant noted, this is “so that we hear
first hand how they are giving each other water so that when we question
it, they will say, ‘but you were there, how can you fight such
a system?’ ” Villagers therefore still feel isolated from
the process of decision-making. Villagers could not imagine how such
a proposal would operate in their own areas. One elderly participant
stated “to laugh at a running person, you must have seen them running,”
suggesting that you cannot agree to something you cannot even visualise.
Though the area covered by the catchment was described and shown on
maps, many villagers felt that the defined area included many socio-religious
entities and relations between local leaders were not always cordial.
Implementation of such a system was therefore likely to face many problems.
Many participants at these sessions felt that the duration of the
consultative meetings was too short. A period of three to five days
would have been allowed participants to rise above their nervousness,
incomprehension, and suspicions, thereby participating more effectively
in the meetings. However, this was not possible as funding for the meetings
was only sufficient to host one day consultations in only six of the
more than thirty sub-catchments. Thus one participant noted, “These
half-baked attempts at consultations are what disillusion participants
because they yield nothing and people go away feeling that they have
been bamboozled.” Some attendees suggested that this pretence of
participation is most problematic as villagers feel cheated and rushed,
therefore becoming more convinced that they should resist. The conditions
for participation also gave the impression of an unfair advantage for
those with their own transport. Most villagers were forced to sit through
the entire meeting since per diems and transport money were only distributed
at the end of each meeting. Commercial farmers not dependent on these
payments often left at any point during the meeting. Some participants
complained that the amounts for travel and lunch were very small, making
it unattractive to participate in future consultative meetings. This
raised the question of who should carry the costs of consultation. Most
commercial farmers indicated that time costs were their primary concern.
Power dynamics among stakeholders Power dynamics among these stakeholders are complex, determined by
both geography and historical context. Commercial farmers exercised
power through the control of water resources. The system of allocation
perpetuated this power. With the new interest in stakeholder participation,
political power has shifted to the rural poor who have become the new
power elites. However, most of these new power elites do not yet know
how to exercise their power. In reality they remain powerless because
they have no access to water storage space with which they could negotiate.
Instead, those commercial farmers apparently disempowered by the new
reforms still retain their control over resources. They have storage
space and the ability to trade that space with other stakeholders. Consequently,
in the water sector stakeholders with political backing do not necessarily
possess real power. In most instances, these new elites are manipulated
(blatantly or covertly) into legitimating decisions that they neither
understand nor support. In the context of Zimbabwe’s water reform
process, participation is not defined by active involvement in discussion
and the exchange of ideas but by presence in a room. The Zimbabwe government and certain donors have together attempted
to create a framework for power sharing among stakeholders in the water
sector. However, the policy of devolution as instituted by the state
does not explicitly allocate equal powers to all stakeholders. Rather,
there is an unwritten but obvious belief that stakeholder participation
means that power has been shifted to those previously disadvantaged
by the water policies of the past or that the presence of communal area
farmers can change the entrenched value and institutional systems that
previously marginalized them. But the three consultative meetings revealed
that most communal area residents do not fully understand this process
and do not feel able to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders
who have more experience, knowledge and resources. Moreover, there is
a difference between white commercial farmers and villagers regarding
strategy and preparation for meetings. Villagers did not seem to communicate
or lobby for common positions before meetings. This failure to hold
informal discussions in arenas other than those financed by the state
or donors seems to suggest that participation in the so called “catchment
board” is not a priority for many villagers. Further problems with
villager participation raise questions about the effectiveness of a
tiered system of resource management. Moreover, villagers remain wary of both white commercial farmers and
a government state that for many years systematically undermined their
confidence about its ability to manage resources. The mistrust between
communal and commercial farmers is longstanding. Longstanding biases
against local participation are coloured by idioms and metaphors of
ignorance that essentially justify the sidelining or ridiculing of views
from especially those from communal area stakeholders. In a study of
local participation, by Sithole and Edziwa (1999), found that despite
the numerous programmes put in place by the state and NGOs to empower
as well as increase actual local participation, communal area residents
still perceived themselves as powerless, uninformed and without control
over the basic means of production. In general, these participants felt
meetings were held not to actually consult but to legitimate existing
inequalities between commercial farmers and villagers under the guise
of friendship. It is therefore a curious paradox that yhe government
with the pilot project seeks to facilitate stakeholder participation
amongst groups that essentially have little respect for one another’s
opinions or actions on natural resource management. The consultation
meeting for the Nyagui catchment is a case in point. Local communal
area participants refused to participate in a process over which they
had neither control over nor the experience to discuss the matter. Institutional
economists have suggested that the degree of participation by different
stakeholders is determined by the perception of how much impact their
participation will have on real decision-making.[36]
Using consultative meetings as foci for stakeholder interactions
The data presented here highlights some of the problems of using the
consultative meeting as an arena for stakeholder participation. PRA
literature suggests that with expert facilitation, group dynamics can
be steered away from domineering stakeholders to allow the silent to
be heard.[37] However, in many of the observed consultative
meetings, there was little facilitation and discussions tended to be
dominated by minority groups or individuals. In all the meetings, the
dominant participants were either commercial farmers or representatives
from district councils. Villagers were generally silent in the meetings.
However, in the Kairezi meeting, the individual who dominated the discussion
had a mandate to do so from other white commercial farmers rather than
from his sub-catchment board. Even where white commercial farmers supposedly
represented a broader rural constituency, representation appeared to
be defined by their own concerns. In such cases, the participant spoke
in very general terms about issues affecting communal or commercial
farmers rather than directing their comments towards a specific sub-catchment
area. Most communal area residents pointed to their limited English proficiency
as the reason for lack of participation. The majority at most of the
meetings had a difficult time understanding the issues raised during
discussions and some appeared to have difficulties reading the documents
circulated at the meetings.[38] Yet during tea breaks
or on the way to bus stops, participants who seemed neither interested
nor able to read the documents were suddenly observed having heated
discussions on the very issues that should have been raised during the
meetings. Another issue highlighted by these meetings was that the English-Shona
translations were often inaccurate. In all meetings it seemed that Shona
could have been used since most white commercial farmers were able to
communicate easily in this language. The pressure to respond in English
to statements made in English made most of the villagers arguments sound
incoherent. Some statements quoted earlier in this paper illustrated
how responses from participants were often a mix of the two languages.
Thus one respondent commented that “Our responses seem confused
and muddled. Do not take this as a sign of ignorance, this is part of
the consultation process that you say you want with us.” The difficulties
faced with language raise an important issue of communication between
multiple stakeholders. Nuances and meanings are potentially misinterpreted
through translation or the lack thereof. A defence of the information presented dominated these discussions.
However, there were assurances by the catchment board secretariat that
corrections would be made to the proposal and discussed again with the
sub-catchment boards. It was not clear how this could be achieved given
the limited funding. Thus, as one elderly rural participant stated,
“how can you fight with what is written? They just want to know
if we can read.” This suggests that modes of communication should
vary, as some tend to limit and frighten certain stakeholders. The “they”
in this statement refers to the catchment board and their secretariat.
It is the characteristic tendency of stakeholders to draw on their multiple
identities (particularly race) to deal with differences. Further, the
distinction between the secretariat and the lower structures may also
suggest that the relationship between structures is still largely top
down. Ignorance of the proposal shown by most villagers suggests that
the council executive is working in isolation of other organizational
structures rather than for or with these structures. The meetings therefore
turned out to be exercises in legitimisation of what some stakeholders
considered an incomprehensible proposal. That none of the participants
in any of the meetings rejected the proposal outright is a surprising
result. However, perhaps there was no rejection of the proposal because
most participants felt powerless or were even unaware that they could
veto or “throw the proposal out.” CONCLUSION As the data presented shows, there are many factors that militate against
devolution of control and management over natural resources to multiple
stakeholders. Participation is also difficult to achieve where there
is a history of stakeholder conflict or confrontation. In all three
meetings, the nature of participation by various stakeholders exposed
the divides between different participants. In a few cases they revealed
situations where co-operation could be possible. However, in most cases
participation in a catchment board setting masks the power dynamics
by projecting the marginalized groups as empowered groups. The new power
elites (villagers) find it hard to exercise power and often must sit
back while real power is exercised by participants (white commercial
farmers) who have more resources. The power of the new elites in this
context only represents a reversal of power distribution among stakeholders.
Stakeholder participation is hampered by a backlog of colonial resentment
that makes genuine co-operative behaviour impossible. In all meetings,
the manner of the commercial farmers suggests that they have indeed
been disempowered and feel no great push to co-operate with the villagers.
Under these circumstances commercial farmers must exercise their power
more discretely. On the other hand, villagers hide behind masks of ignorance
and impatience in order to dissociate their participation from the devolved
authorities. Murphree (1999) describes such action as “socially
constructed vetoes” where communities excise their power to express
disapproval of processes or actions. The water reform process in Zimbabwe
currently promotes a framework for natural resources management which
reduces government spending, transfers accountability to water users
and yet maintains control over revenues generated for little effort.
Moreover, the transaction costs for achieving genuine devolution are
very high, especially where communal are residents must be included. Participants’ perception of the state’s role in resource
management have not changed. Government is still seen as an entity distinct
from stakeholders which maintains the power of veto, rendering stakeholder
participation meaningless. Donor funding may undermine rather than advance
participation if participants especially where participants go away
feeling out manoeuvred. Furthermore, continued reliance on donor financing
of stakeholder participation is unlikely to result in the long-term
sustainability of such a process. Despite the overwhelming support for
the policy of devolution, no level playing field exists for all stakeholders.
The water reform process in Zimbabwe provides yet another example of
hastily and ill conceived attempts at solving long- standing disparities
among stakeholders without substantive investment in the “glue”
that could make such co-operation work.
NOTES [1] This paper is based on work undertaken as part
of the Broadening Access and Strengtherning Input Market Systems/collaborative
Research Support Program (BASIS/CRISP) in Zimbabwe. Several people in
the project contributed comments that helped shape this paper. Project
personnel (Claudious Chikozho, Slyvestor Hwenha and Professor Bill Derman)
have contributed insights and comments on the early drafts of the paper.
Professor Campbell and Dr Dore reviewed initial drafts of the paper.
Claudious Chikozho and Syvestor Hwenha attended some of the meetings
with me and contributed insights on stakeholder dynamics and participation.
Names of individuals who made statements cited in this paper have been
protected. [2] White 1996. [3] Arnold 1998. [4] Arnstein 1969. [5] Arnstein 1969, Cornwall and Gaventa 2000. [6] Fisher 1995. [7] Weber et al. 2000. [8] Bratton 1994. [9] Bratton 1994, 233. [10] Vallareal 1992 [11] Ingles e. al. 1999 [12] See Murphree 1994, Guijit and Shah, 1998. [13] Guijit and Shah 1998, Edmunds and Wollenberg
2000. [14] For institutional and legal aspects see Nhira
1997; for politics and advocacy for reform see Derman and Ferguson 1999. [15] University of Zimbabwe workshop on “Water
for Agriculture: Current Practices and Future Prospects” (March
11-13, Harare, Zimbabwe). [16] Dougherty 1997, 43. [17] Nhira 1997, Derman and Ferguson 1999. [18] Chatora et al. 1996, Nhira 1997, Derman and
Fegurson 1999. [19] Dougherty 1997. [20] Mazoe Board (April 5, 1998) [21] BASIS/CRISP – Broadening Access and Strengthening
Input Market Systems/Collaborative Research Support Programme. [22] This paper is one of several papers focusing
on various aspects of the water reform process. Already published and
excellent complement to this paper is Derman, B. and Ferguson, A. (1999).
“Against the Flow: Activism and Advocacy in the Reform of Zimbabwe’s
Water Sector.” Culture and Agriculture 21, no. 3: 3-9. [23] Long and Long 1992, Bratton 1994, Scoones and
Thompson 1994. [24] Scoones and Thompson 1994. [25] Fortmann 1995, 2. [26] Goebel 1996. [27] Sithole 1999. [28] The Pungwe Pipe Line Project supplies water
to a nearby city of Mutare. The environmental impact assessments for
the project emphasised the need to allow water to flow downstream to
other users especially those in Mozambique. [29] Ribot 1999. [30] Burkie et al. 1999. [31] Agrawal and Ribot 1999. [32] See Murphree 1990, Murombedzi 1992. [33] Mahapatra 1999. [34] Plant and Plant 1992, WECD 1989, The Ecologist
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