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The coming to power of Frelimo in 1975 was facilitated by the Mozambican
peasantry due to the fact that Frelimo was actively supported by the
rural peasants. Along with ZANU in Zimbabwe, Frelimo was one of the
few liberation organisations sustained and supported by China to achieve
state power, in part due to the adoption of avowedly Maoist tactics.
Indeed, Mozambique's population was almost all peasant and rural and
the economic base of the country was agriculture. Yet, having achieved
political power at the state level, Frelimo degenerated "from a
popular and victorious liberation movement into a bureaucratic, anti-peasant,
one-party state (p. 1)." At the same time, Frelimo gave priority
to industrialisation, common to many African countries at the time,
with agriculture reduced to supplying exports for earning foreign exchange
and raw materials for domestic industry. As it turned out, the policies
adopted by Frelimo were as unfavourable to Mozambique's peasantry as
those of the Portuguese. Bowen demonstrates that this has not been an
aberration arising after the wholesale adoption of neo-liberal solutions
to Mozambique's developmental impasse, but rather, it was already in
place during Frelimo's socialist vanguard era. They have continued under
World Bank strictures and directives, but essentially spring from a
shared set of negative policies towards the peasantry. Bowen's work
seeks to provide a new look at the effect these policies have had on
the peasantry and agricultural production. Bowen focuses on the colonial period between 1950 and 1975. It is from
this point that she then looks at the socialist collectivization experiment.
In contrast to those who have blamed Mozambique's calamitous post-independence
decline on apartheid South Africa's destabilization attempts and the
vicious civil war with South African supported contras (i.e. Renamo),
Bowen argues that Mozambique's decline in production is rooted in policies
established during colonialism and continued by Frelimo. She takes issue
also with those who argued that the main reason for the major fall in
agricultural production was the disturbance of settlement patterns and
the denigration of traditional practices by the "modernizing"
Frelimo cadres sent out into the rural areas. Bowen rightly, I believe,
argues that such attempts by Frelimo were progressive and provided,
invariably for the first time ever, precious health and education facilities,
as well as potable water, to nearly one and a half thousand communal
villages. In addition, Bowen is right to point out that much of "traditional
authority" derived its position from the colonial period and with
ties to the authoritarian colonial regime. Their demise should not be
overly lamented. Frelimo's problem, Bowen asserts, was that it thought it could change
the peasantry through collective production, the setting up of co-operatives
and urbanisation through establishing communal villages. The opposition
to a fraction of "middle class" agricultural producers was
rooted in a hostility by Frelimo, shared by the Portuguese colonialists,
to an emergent middle class that may develop economic and political
independence and resist the state. Whilst it did dismantle oppressive
rural structures, Frelimo's ambition to clear away what they regarded
as an antiquated way of living and production was doomed, particularly
as there was no debate with affected persons on how this could be achieved
and whether, indeed, change was even desired. To argue her case, Bowen
uses data collected from in-depth fieldwork carried out in the Ilha
de Josina Machel for two years, which is a rural area where the Incomati
and Matseculi rivers merge in Manhica district, Maputo Province. The strength of Bowen's book is in the assertion of the continuation
of the colonial period and Frelimo's rule -- both the Portuguese and
the post-independence authorities set up co-operatives. She also shows
how individuals and family groups accommodated both colonialist and
socialist policies to form survival strategies. Simply put, Frelimo
(and the colonialists) did not curtail options outside of the official
policies: agency remained and indeed stimulated a relative degree of
manoeuvrability, with the co-operative ventures being utilised to the
peasants' own benefit. This of course was severely diminished as the
war intensified in the rural areas. The book is an intriguing story of the development (and decline) of
peasant-based agriculture in southern Mozambique from the 1950s until
the mid-1980s. The study broadens its focus to illustrate how the micro-region
was brought into the South African mining industry and how peasants
interacted with the Portuguese settler farms. The focus on southern
Mozambique does lead to perhaps an over-emphasis on the effect of this
integration, with Bowen arguing Portuguese Mozambique was integrated
into a regional southern African economy and that this was necessarily
under South African hegemony. Mozambique's economy was hence structured
mainly in the interests of South African capital. Whilst this is true
to a degree, it is far more so for the southern part of the country,
namely Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane provinces, than it is for the central
and northern parts of Mozambique. This aside, the study is an excellent
example of in-depth fieldwork and critical empirical analysis. The book
is recommended for researchers interested in the history of southern
Mozambique, agriculture in southern Africa, and of the role of the peasantry
in African economic life. Ian Taylor |