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Abstract
The prominent
African philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti is of the view
that the African conception of personhood is
decidedly communitarian. He argues, however, that
although there are various ways of conceiving the
communitarian concept of personhood, some of these
ways are erroneous. He claims that his conception
of personhood, which privileges epistemological
growth, is the most accurate account of personhood
in African thinking. In his view ontological
progression is marked by a successful induction
into society at various stages of the individual’s
life. The main aim of this paper is to argue
against Menkiti’s articulation of the concept of
personhood through epistemological growth
particularly through his use of the word “it” to
denote different stages of epistemic stations. The
paper seeks to show that his use of the word “it”
is not helpful in his argument and that a
conception of personhood that articulates itself
in terms of epistemological advancement as
espoused by Menkiti complicates the communitarian
view of personhood.
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